No one has a clue, you know. It’s that… that… bottle necks in production thing, innit?
U.S. blames drugmakers for slow flu shots
November 11, 2009 — 12:16pm ET | By Tracy Staton
Who’s at fault for the slow-to-market H1N1 vaccine? USA Today asked consumers, and more than half of them blamed drug companies. Some 62 percent said they blame pharma either a great deal or moderately. The government, by contrast, got 58 percent of the blame.
We all know why vaccine production was slow off the starting blocks. The first seed strain of the H1N1 virus didn’t multiply as fast as the usual seasonal flu strains, setting vaccine makers back. Since then, the companies have been able to amp up production. And they’ve been shouting that news from the rooftops. Most recently, it was Sanofi-Aventis CEO Chris Viehbacher (photo) who said that U.S. production had hit optimal speed.
But vaccine makers still haven’t caught up with promised delivery volumes. Some 41 million doses are available as of today, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg said in a letter to doctors.
Plus, the U.S. didn’t embrace new vaccine technology that could have sped up production, namely, adjuvants. These shot-boosters allow vaccine makers to produce more doses with less actual virus. The only company producing an adjuvanted flu vaccine for the U.S., GlaxoSmithKline, has just now won FDA approval.
Yadda yadda.
And that’s what people SEE. "Gosh, the gummint ordered a bunch, but the danged manufactors had bottlenecks."
What people apparently DON’T see are all the vaccine makers driven out of the business by various government intrusions into the vaccine marketplace over the last two decades (and longer).
Here:
In 1993, Hillary Clinton’s Vaccines for Children program was set up to buy children’s vaccines from manufacturers and provide them to Medicaid clients and the uninsured free of charge. To ensure low prices, the program legislation capped the price of the three vaccines then in use.
The price controls did what price controls always do, they created a shortage. As a 2005 Department of Health and Human Services budget brief pointed out, "The price caps [were] so low, however, that the tetanus vaccine was removed from the Vaccines for Children program in 1998 when no vender would bid on the contract."
[…]
By 2002, the VFC program was purchasing slightly more than 40 percent of U.S. pediatric vaccines. Its focus on low prices likely helped destabilize long-term vaccine supplies by eroding profit margins. When profit margins are low, firms move scarce capital to other, more highly valued uses. Production facilities do not get repaired, replaced, or upgraded. When current plant and equipment wear out, producers simply exit the market.
A 2003 report from the Institute of Medicine on vaccine finance reported that the number of vaccine producers licensed for the U.S. market fell from 26 producers in 1967 to four producers in 2002. Factors cited for the decline included more stringent regulation, concerns about tort liability and "poor returns on investment."
In short, the government’s myopic focus on low, low prices likely destroyed the U.S. vaccine industry.
Here:
Nearly a decade ago, a number of us participated in a similar conference at the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on the Clinton Administration’s Vaccines for Children Program. We discussed the impact federalizing nearly 70 percent of the vaccine market would have on the development of new vaccines, and how it would affect the availability of the pediatric vaccines recommended back then. The fact is, we raised the concern that shortages were a potential byproduct and that the Clinton plan was likely to hinder development of new vaccines in the future.
Here we are just a few years later and we are down to four vaccine manufacturers. As demand for vaccines has gone up, the number of suppliers has gone down. We have had product shortages, and we are selling some pediatric vaccines at 15 cents a dose. At the same time, the cost of manufacturing and the cost of compliance with regulation have both gone up.
It takes a little reading between the lines to discover that the FDA was at the heart of the recent vaccine-supply problems. In comments to the media and Congress, government (especially FDA) officials have obscured this truth. Here is a typical statement:
the recent shortages stem from a number of factors including: 1) the withdrawal from the market of one manufacturer, 2) difficulties in the manufacturing process, 3) temporary shutdowns of facilities for upgrades or maintenance, or to correct manufacturing deficiencies observed by the manufacturer or FDA during inspections, and 4) other factors, such as transition to thimerosal-free vaccine formulations. (U.S. Senate 2002a, 1)In the following sections, I show how each of these “factors” can be traced back to the FDA.
Withdrawal from the Market. Most official (especially FDA) statements on the shortages emphasized that some companies left the vaccine business. An FDA press statement on the shortages stated sardonically, “Calling it a business decision, Wyeth Lederle withdrew from the manufacture of DTaP and Td vaccine” (qtd. in Meadows 2002, emphasis added).
The statement fails to mention that Wyeth’s “business decision” came two months after the company had been forced to pay a record $30 million fine under the terms of a CGMP consent decree (“Company News: American Home” 2000; Russell 2002). The decree also forced the company to hire independent inspectors to monitor CGMP compliance at the two plants where violations had been found (in Marietta, Pennsylvania, and in Pearl River, New Jersey). These inspectors were to report directly to the FDA. Any problems they found would have to be fixed on a schedule “approved by FDA.” If the company failed to meet the schedule, it would be forced to pay $15,000 each day it remained in noncompliance, up to a $5 million limit. Despite the steep fine and strict terms, the FDA admitted that it never actually “found contaminated Wyeth products and is aware of no illnesses” resulting from the CGMP violations at the plants in question (U.S. FDA 2000a).
At the same time, a maker of influenza vaccine was jumping through similar FDA hoops. Parkedale Pharmaceuticals was struggling to comply with the terms of its own FDA consent decree. The FDA inspected Parkedale’s influenza vaccine plant in Rochester, Michigan, in October 1999, found a number of CGMP violations, and ordered the company to correct them. Six months later another FDA inspection revealed that the company remained out of compliance. This time the FDA ordered Parkedale to halt production and distribution of its vaccine pending future approval (“FDA Halts” 2000; Miecko 2000b).
A month later Parkedale notified the FDA that it had completed “all actions required by the agency” (King Pharmaceuticals 2000), and the company was allowed to resume manufacturing. FDA monitoring continued. For the next several weeks, Parkedale held “teleconferences” with the FDA and submitted “biweekly written status reports on the corrective actions” it was still taking. Then, on June 9, 2000, Parkedale officials met with officials from the FDA for more discussions. The company said the FDA was “pleased and encouraged by Parkedale’s efforts and progress to date” (qtd. in “Parkedale Pharmaceuticals Meets” 2000).
A few weeks later the FDA conducted another inspection and again ordered a halt to Parkedale’s operations.
That goes on and on.
"The U.S. vaccine system has some good things going for it, but it also has some important deficiencies," said Frank Sloan, a professor of economics at Duke University, who chaired an Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee that in August issued a report, "Financing Vaccines in the 21st Century." The IOM is affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences.
Mr. Sloan said money — notably the low prices the federal government pays for childhood vaccines — is a primary factor in many of the vaccine shortages that have plagued the country.
"We’re using a lot of old vaccines that are very cheap, only a dollar or so a dose," Mr. Sloan said in a telephone interview. "The government tries to get low prices, which discourages research and development [into new vaccines]."
The IOM report found that vaccines are not very important to drug companies financially, because only 1.5 cents per dollar of drug-company revenue comes from vaccines. The report urged that financial incentives be offered to stimulate new vaccine development.
Mr. Sloan said undoubtedly, the low prices paid for vaccines played a role in the manufacturing glitches that, for a time, stalled Wyeth’s production of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine.
"Because of the prices being paid, some firms are not putting enough resources into production," he said.
And few companies are making vaccines these days. In 1967, about 30 U.S. firms manufactured vaccines. But now there are only five, according to the IOM report.
Every one of these articles and reports says the same thing: Government intrusions into the market has killed the vaccine producing industry, but if you can find it being reported on a major media website, or coming out of the mouth of a politician, let me know.
What has happened with vaccines is what everyone should have expected would happen. There’s no mystery to any of it, or, if there is a mystery, it’s the mystery of why politicians whose big idea is to gather every kind of endeavor under government skirts aren’t promptly locked in the stocks and pelted with rotten vegetables until they admit the stupid error of their ways.
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